THE THEORY OF IMPLEMENTATION WHEN THE PLANNER IS A PLAYER

Luis Corchon, Sandeep Baliga (baliga@kellogg.northwestern.edu) and Tomas Sjostrom

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: In this paper we study a situation were the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is substituted by the planner herself. We assume 1) agents have complete information and play simultaneously; and 2) given the messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different restrictions on the planner's out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We compare our results to standard results on Nash implementation.

Keywords: Implementation; Commitment; Incomplete Information; Equilibrium Refinements. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 1995-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1995-14.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1995 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player (1997)
Working Paper: The Theory of Implemetation when the Planner is a PLayer (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1995-14

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