Individual rights and collective responsibility: The rights-egalitarian solution

Antonio Villar, Carmen Herrero () and Michael Maschler
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Michael Maschler: Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: The problem of distributing a given amount of a divisible good among a set of agents which may have individual entitlements is considered here. A solution to this problem, called the Rights-Egalitarian Solution, is proposed and characterized. This allocation rule divides equally among the agents the difference between the aggregate entitlements and the amount of the good available. A relevant feature of the analysis developed is that no sign restriction is established on the parameters of the model (that is, the aggregate entitlements may exceed or fall short of the amount of the good, agents' rights may be positive or negative, the allocation may involve a redistribution on agents' holding, etc.)

Keywords: Distributive problems; allocation rules; solution functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1996-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1996-04.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1996 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights-egalitarian solution (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1996-04

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