Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments

Josep E. Peris and Begoña Subiza

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: Tournaments are complete and asymmetric binary relations. This type of binary relation rules out the possibility of ties or indifferences which are common in different contexts. In this work we generalize, from a normative point of view, some important tournaments solutions (top cycle, uncovered set and minimal covering) to the context where ties are possible.

Keywords: Tournament; uncovered set; minimal covering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 1997-02
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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1997-05.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1997 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-05

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