Equal-loss solution for monotonic coalitional games

Begoña Subiza and María del Carmen Marco Gil
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María del Carmen Marco Gil: Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: A new solution concept to monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility is introduced. This proposal, called the coalitional equal-loss solution, is based on the idea that players withing a coalition should have equal losses from a point of maximum expectations. The proposal generalizes the rational equal-loss solution defined on the subclass of bargaining problems as well as the Shapley value defined on the subclass of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility.

Keywords: Coalitional Games; Rational Equal-Loss Solution; Shapley Value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1997-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-06

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