Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations

Jose Alcalde, Antonio Romero-Medina and David Perez-Castrillo
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Antonio Romero-Medina: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simplesequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then ,each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents'preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium that firms'optimal correspondence when firms employ undominated strategies. Finally we construct anothersimple sequential mechanism to implement workers' optimal correspondence when agents'preferences are additive.

Keywords: Job matching markets; implementation; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1997-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1997-10.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1997 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-10

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