Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games

Jose Vila () and Amparo Urbano

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: The main result of this paper is that any correlated equlibrium pay-off of a two-player completeinformation game with rational parameters can be reached through an unmediated costlesspre-play conversation scheme. This problem was left open by Barany and Forges' analysis. Ourcommunication protocol does not rely on external mediators of any kind. It is also self-enforcing(in the sense that no player has an incentive to deviate if the other does not) and quasi-sure (inthe sense that a 'deviation from the rules' of a player can be detected by the other with aprobability as close as one as we want). Coordination failures that may arise in many economicsituations are solved by applying our pre-play communication scheme.

Keywords: Communications; protocol; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 1997-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-26

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