- LOBBY GROUPS AND THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

M. Socorro Puy

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We study a model of competition between two political parties with policy compromise. There is aspecial interest group with well-defined preferences on political issues. Voters are of two kinds:impressionable and knowledgeable. The impressionable voters are influenced by the electioncampaigns. The objective of the parties is to obtain the maximum votes. Parties compete forfinancial support from a given interest group. Each party proposes a plataform in exchange for anamount of campaign funds, and the interest group decides whether to accept or reject each ofcampaign funds, and the interest group decides whether to accept or reject each of theseproposals. We show that parties competition resembles, to a certain extent, Bertrandcompetition. Furthermore, in equilibrium only one party gets funds from interest group. This resultdiffers from the one obtained in a similar model by Grossman and Helpman (1996a) (1996b), inwhich, in equlibrium, both parties are financed by the interest group. This differnce asisesbecause Grossman and Helpman assume that it is the interest group who makes the proposalsto the political parties.

Keywords: Contract proposal; Lobby groups; Policy compromise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1999-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published by Ivie

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1999-18.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1999 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Lobby Groups and the Financial Support of Election Campaigns (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1999-18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Departamento de Edición ().