- TO MERGE OR NOT TO MERGE: THAT IS THE QUESTION

Ramón Faulí-Oller (fauli@merlin.fae.ua.es) and Luis Corchon
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Ramón Faulí-Oller: Universidad de Alicante

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is notinformed about the parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. Wefind that most of the standard tools in dominant strategy implementation, like the revelationprinciple or the Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanism can not be applied in our framework. We showthat implementation in dominant strategies of the optimal merger policy without budget balance ispossible under an additional assumption. The same assumption makes possible theimplementation in Nash equilibrium of the optimal merger policy with budget balance.

Keywords: Merge; Antitrust; Welfare. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2000-01
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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2000-01.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2000 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: To merge or not to merge: That is the question (2004)
Working Paper: To Merge or Not To Merge: That is the Question (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-01

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