- SHAPLEY-SHUBIK AND BANZHAF INDICES REVISITED

Federico Valenciano () and Annick Laruelle ()

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We provide a new axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices in thedomain of simple superadditive games by means of transparent axioms. Only anonymity isshared with the former characterizations in the literature. The rest of the axioms are substitutedby more transparent ones in terms of power in collective decision-making procedures. Inparticular, a clear restatement and a compelling alternative for the transfer axiom are proposed.Only one axiom differentiates the characterization of either index, and these differentiatingaxioms provide a new point of comparison. In a first step both indices are characterized up to azero and a unit of scale. Then both indices are singled out by simple normalizing axioms.

Keywords: Power indices; voting power; collective decision-making; simple games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2000-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-02

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