DELEGATION AND POLARIZATION OF PLATFORMS

Ramón Faulí-Oller () and Ignacio Ortuño Ortín
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Ramón Faulí-Oller: Universidad de Alicante
Ignacio Ortuño Ortín: Universidad de Alicante

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.

Keywords: Political Parties; Delegation; Polarization. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2002-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-01

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