CARTEL SUSTAINABILITY AND CARTEL STABILITY

Marc Escrihuela-Villar ()

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel. Firms will be more willing to participate because otherwise, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion.

Keywords: Collusion; Partial Cartels; Trigger strategies; Optimal Punishment. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2002-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published by Ivie

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2002-16.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-16

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