THE TALMUD RULE AND THE SECUREMENT OF AGENTS? AWARDS

Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero () and Antonio Villar
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Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero: Yale University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: This paper provides a new characterization of the Talmud rule by means of a new property, called securement. This property says that any agent holding a feasible claim will get at least one nht of her claim, where n is the number of agents involved. We show that securement together with a weak version of path independence and the standard properties of self-duality and consistency characterize the Talmud rule.

Keywords: bankruptcy problems; Talmud rule; characterization results (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2003-02
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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2003-05.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2003 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2003-05

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