ON PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS OF COMPLEMENTARY GOODS

Veronika Grimm ()

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We compare sequential and bundle auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively affects future market opportunities and competition varies across projects. We find that - if allocation of the projects has to be ensured - bundle auctions with subsequent resale opportunities yield a lower and less risky overall price, whereas sequential procurement leads to the efficient outcome.

Keywords: Sequential auctions; bundling; stochastic scale effects; procurement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D92 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2004-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2004-02

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