Strategic truth and deception

Carlos Oyarzun and Paan Jindapon

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We study strategic communication in a sender-receiver gamein which the sender sends a message about the observed quality ofthe good to the receiver who may accept or reject the good without knowing the true quality or the sender's type. The game has infinitely many perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. An equilibrium refinement identifies a unique class of equilibria that are outcome equivalent to the equilibrium in which the neutral sender always tells the truth and the biased sender adopts a feigning strategy to disguise himself by not fully exaggerating about the quality of the good.

Keywords: Cheap Talk; Feigning Strategy; Strategic Information Transmission. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2009-24

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