Noncooperative justifications for old bankruptcy rules
José M. Jiménez Gómez ()
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José M. Jiménez Gómez: Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ()
Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)
Abstract:
In this paper we use two different sets of Commonly Accepted Equity Principles to provide new characterizations of well known bankruptcy rules from an strategic viewpoint. In this sense, we extend the results obtained by Chun, 1989, and Herrero, 2003, who followed the van Damme's approach, 1986, for solving Nash type bargaining problems, but in bankruptcy problems. Specifially, by using, on the one hand, the Unanimous Concessions mechanism we justify Piniles' and the Constrained Egalitarian rules, and, on the other hand, with the Diminishing Claims procedure we retrieve the Dual of Pinile's and the Dual of Constrained Egalitarian rules.
Keywords: Bankruptcy problems; strategic approach; noncooperative justifications; Piniles¿ rule; Constrained Egalitarian rule. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2010-15.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2010 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2010-15
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