Quality choice and advertising regulation in broadcasting markets

Francisco Martínez-Sánchez and Miguel González-Maestre

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends, crucially, on the interplay between the net direct effect of advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies tending to eliminate advertising as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms.

Keywords: endogenous quality; two-sided markets; broadcasting duopoly; publicly-owned platform; advertising regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L33 L82 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published by Ivie

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2012-03.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2012 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Quality choice and advertising regulation in broadcasting markets (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2012-03

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