Financing public goods and attitudes toward immigration
José Romero () and
Inigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe ()
Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)
We present a model in which individuals choose both the level of provision of a public good and the quota of low-skilled immigrants that are allowed into the country. Individuals can supplement the public good in the private market. Immigrants affect natives through three channels: (i) the labor market; (ii) tax collection; (iii) the quality of the public good. We find that the higher the political weight of the rich (highly skilled) is, the less tolerant the poor and the middle-class are toward immigration and the more demanding they are toward increasing public spending. The rich are the most favorable to immigration. As they have more weight, the political outcome is closer to their preferences and further from the preferences of the other groups. We use data from the European Social Survey to test the implications of our model.
Keywords: Probabilistic voting model; public goods; immigration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mig, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Published by Ivie
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2013-09.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2013 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Financing public goods and attitudes toward immigration (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2013-09
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Departamento de Edición ().