Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados

Vicente Calabuig

Working Papers. Serie EC from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We present in this work a survey on sequential bargaining models with complete information that explain inefficiencies, frequently observed and with great economic impact, such as strikes, the establishment of commitments and the intransigent position of the negotiators. Furthermore, we pose several criticisms to these models and point out possible lines of future research for the literature. En este trabajo se presenta una panorámica de los modelos de negociación secuencial con información completa que explica fenómenos ineficientes frecuentemente observados y de gran repercusión económica, tales como las huelgas, el establecimiento de compromisos previos y la posición intransigente de los negociadores. Asimismo, se plantean diversas críticas a estos modelos y se apuntan posibles líneas de investigaci6n futura para la literatura.

Keywords: Negociación; juegos repetidos; huelgas; compromiso Bargaining; repeated games; strikes; commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 1997-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasec:1997-03

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