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From party state capture to party business capture - Model feature of Visegrád countries?

Miklós Szanyi ()
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Miklós Szanyi: Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

No 226, IWE Working Papers from Institute for World Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: The FDI-led development path of the Visegrád countries has been queried most recently. The paper analyses one of the potential reasons of this strategic turn: the struggle between political elites. One elite was bound to the strong presence of multinational business and the institutions of the “competition state”. Their positions were challenged by another political elite that allied mainly with local bourgeoisie. One main arena of conflicts is the economy where political elites try to widen their influence in order to gain financial support. New forms of rent seeking and corruption became possible after the V4 accession to the EU when the flow of financial aid increased. Aid was channeled to partisan firms in public procurement tenders that made legal corruption possible. Political and social control over this practice declined with the demise of classic program parties’ role in politics and the raise of populist “business firm” political parties.

Keywords: Visegrád countries; rent seeking; legal corruption; business capture; elites (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H82 P16 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2016-11
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