An experimental test of reporting systems for deception
Sascha Behnk (),
Iván Barreda-Tarrazona () and
Aurora García-Gallego ()
No 2017/11, Working Papers from Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain)
We use a repeated sender-receiver game in which sender behavior is revealed to future counterparts by (i) standardized computer reports or by (ii) individual reports composed by the receivers, representing a common form of consumer feedback. Compared to our baseline without reporting, computer reports reduce deception in all payoff scenarios while the effect of individually written reports is lower and in some scenarios only marginal. This comparably weaker impact can be explained by the senders’ anticipation of a high number of missing or deficient receiver reports that we find. We conclude that the precision of a reporting system has a higher importance for reducing deception than its personal character via individual feedback. Surprisingly, the reliability of computer reports is not correctly anticipated by receivers, who trust individually written reports more in the beginning and hence seem to back the wrong horse initially.
Keywords: deception; trust; reporting systems; reputation; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D63 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-law and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jau:wpaper:2017/11
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