Financial Supervision Fragmentation and Central Bank Independence: The Two Sides of the Same Coin?

Andreas Freytag () and Donato Masciandaro ()

No 14/2005, Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) from Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: This paper analyses how the central banks role in the monetary institutional setting can affect the unification process of the overall financial supervision architecture. Using indicators of monetary commitment and central bank independence, we claim that these legal proxies show an inverse link with financial supervision unification. Therefore, the trade off still holds between the supervisory and the central bank involvement per se, however, monetary commitment and independence do also matter. In this respect, in an institutional setting characterized by a central bank deeply and successfully involved in supervision, or legally independent, a multi-authority model is likely to occur.

Keywords: Financial Supervision; Single Authority; Central Bank Independence; Monetary Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 G20 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-fin, nep-fmk, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jen:jenasw:2005-14

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) from Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().