 Politische Rationalität und ökonomische Effizienz in der HaushaltspolitikRainer Pappenheim Working Paper Series B from Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration Abstract: Budgetary policy in the Federal Republic of Germany is viewed by many as being relatively inefficient as measured against the economic principle of Pareto-efficiency. It is shown that the "inefficiencies" in budgetary planning, execution and oversight can be related to the credible commitments that politicians want to give interest groups to ensure that the groups will support them in the future. To enhance political commitment, institutional arrangements - besides reputational considerations - play a decisive role. The incrementalistic budgetary planning process, the inflexible budgetary principles and the superficial budgetary control mechanisms all have commitment advantages, especially compared to so-called "rational" budgeting like the zero-base budgeting. If politicians are able to credibly commit themselves to deliver subsidies, regulations and similar measures to interest groups the groups will be likely to support them with money, information and votes. The author concludes that not only in budgetary policy but also in many other areas of political activity the question of credible commitment has to be considered to explain reality. JEL-codes: D73 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jen:jenavo:1998-11 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Paper Series B from Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration |
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