Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des europäischen Fiskalwettbewerbs

Gregor Larbig

Working Paper Series B from Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: The standard theory in tax competition as one part of the broader field of fiscal competition uses an comparative approach by drawing parallels between privat and institutional competition. The paper argues that this approach ignores certain limits of institutional competition like transaction costs, market failure concerning public goods and missing property rights. An agenda for a new fiscal constitution for Europe should take into account these considerations by fostering basic competitive regulations for protecting immobile factors and for preventing new rent seeking coalitions.

Keywords: Institutional Competition; Fiscal Competition; Tax Competition; Coordination; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F0 H0 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-03-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jen:jenavo:1999-02

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