Heterogeneous Behavioral Rules in the Oligopolistic Case
Markus Pasche ()
Working Paper Series B from Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultïät
In a static symmetric duopoly the set of behavioral rules is extended to different types of markup pricing. Using an equilibrium concept suggested in Pasche (2001), it is shown that dependend on the markup neither pure Cournot nor pure Bertrand behavior is a behavioral equilibrium profile. Instead, there is a rationale for the usage of simple heuristics. The presence of markup rules leads to Stackelberg outcomes. Furthermore, pure markup behavior is more competitive than in Cournot case but less competitive than in Bertrand case. It is shown, that multiple behavioral equilibria and heterogeneous behavior may arise, where at least one player uses price setting strategies.
Keywords: oligopoly; markup rules; heterogeneity; behavioral equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 D21 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jen:jenavo:2002-01
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