Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry
No 05-002, JEPS Working Papers from JEPS
This paper looks at competition in the telecommunication industry. We determine the equilibrium pricing parameters for a duopoly situation with a particular emphasis on the role of competitively chosen non-reciprocal access prices. In the symmetric equilibrium the networks optimally choose positive access charge markups which reconciles empirical observation with the theoretical economics literature.
Keywords: Telecommunications; access pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jep:wpaper:05002
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