Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees
Elisabeth Schulte ()
No 06-003, JEPS Working Papers from JEPS
This paper is concerned with the efficiency of information aggregation in a committee whose members have heterogeneous preferences over a binary decision variable. In a first stage, agents may exchange private (decision-relevant) information which is assumed to be verifiable. Then they reach a decision via majority voting. We study different information environments and identify conditions under which full information aggregation is possible. In particular, if preferences are common knowledge and each committee member is endowed with information full information aggregation is possible despite preference heterogeneity.
Keywords: Information aggregation; committee decisions; preference heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-knm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to jeps.repec.org:80 (No such host is known. )
Journal Article: Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jep:wpaper:06003
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in JEPS Working Papers from JEPS
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Gall ().