Press Subsidies and Information in a Democratic Society

Martin Leroch

No 1508, Working Papers from Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

Abstract: In this paper we analyze how subsidies may a ect the qual- ity provision of newspapers in three structures dominating this market: monopolistic structures as is the case for many regional newspapers, duopolistic structures, as is the case for newspaper markets in metropolitan areas or, possibly, nation-wide newspa- pers, as well as markets with monopolistic competition. We and that frequently used sales subsidies may be counter-productive as they can lead the newspaper to reduce journalistic quality. We conclude that a possibly better way to sustain high levels of jour- nalistic quality would be to invest in the consumption capital of the readers.

Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2015-09-15
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://download.uni-mainz.de/RePEc/pdf/Discussion_Paper_1508.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jgu:wpaper:1508

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Research Unit IPP ().