Rubinstein Bargaining with Other-Regarding Preferences

Martin Leroch

No 1509, Working Papers from Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

Abstract: While classic bargaining theory abstracts from other-regarding motives, bargaining processes often take place among parties who care about each other's payo . In this paper, I analyze how other- regarding preferences a ect the outcome, duration, and use of means to harm the other in reference to a Rubinstein bargain- ing game. It is found that agents regarding each other's payo negatively will reach less equal outcomes, take longer to reach this outcome and are more likely to harm each other if they have means available to do so.

Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2015-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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