Autonomy and Accountability: Strategic Behavior of German State Leaders During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Salvatore Barbaro (), Reyn van Ewijk () and Julia Rode
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Salvatore Barbaro: Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany
Reyn van Ewijk: Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany
Julia Rode: Deutsche Bundesbank, Germany

No 2503, Working Papers from Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic presented governments with unprecedented challenges, requiring decisions that balanced public health measures against substantial social and economic impacts. This study examines the strategic and opportunistic behaviors of regional officials in Germany during the pandemic. Using a comprehensive empirical analysis based on hundreds of statements from state incumbents, we shed light on the dynamics of state level political behavior. Our findings reveal that German regional leaders emphasized their autonomy when performance metrics were favorable but strategically shifted responsibility when outcomes were less favorable. This behavior underscores the dual potential of federal systems as both laboratories of democracy and breeding grounds for responsibility-avoiding (opportunistic) behavior.

Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2025-02-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-pol
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