The Equilibrium Level of Rigidity in a Hierarchy

Joseph Harrington ()

Economics Working Paper Archive from The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics

Abstract: A hierarchy is considered in which those agents who perform better advance to higher levels When agents are heterogeneous and endowed with simple behavioral rules Harrington (1998a) showed that agents at high levels tend to be rigid in the sense that their behavior is unresponsive to their environment relative to agents at low levels In the current paper agents are homogeneous but sophisticated as their behavior is required to be consistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium Agents at high levels are found instead to be flexible relative to agents at low levels

Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: The Equilibrium Level of Rigidity in a Hierarchy (1999)
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