Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

Louis Puttermann, Jean-Robert Tyran and Kenju Kamei
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Louis Putterman

No 2010-20, NRN working papers from The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

Abstract: The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.

Keywords: Public good; voluntary contribution; formal sanction; experiment; penalty; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D71 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.labornrn.at/wp/2010/wp1020.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jku:nrnwps:2010_20

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NRN working papers from The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by René Böheim ().