EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Crackdown on Corruption: A Natural Experiment in Safe and Swing Districts

Bledi Celiku

2013 Papers from Job Market Papers

Abstract: I investigate the theoretical and empirical effects of increased law enforcement on the equilibrium level of bribes for the case of Albania during the period of 2005-2010. My paper centers on "harassment" bribes, which consist of payments for public services that by law should be free. I model bribery behavior as a negotiation process between public oofficials and consumers. As enforcement increases, corruption prevalence can, in theory, increase or decrease. Recent policy changes in Albania o er a good natural experiment to test this empirically. Two events took place in 2007: local elections and an increase in fines against corruption. I examine how the 2007 fine increase for corrupt behavior impacts bribery. Data show that corruption is a bigger problem for poor people and since the left's political platform is more pro-poor, looking at the left-right governed district variation seems appropriate. Using a difference in difference methodology that compares safe left and right-governed districts, I find that a 10 percent increase in enforcement leads to a 4.38 percent drop in bribery frequency. As enforcement increases, quality of services does not improve and enforcement measures are less e ffective on the medical and education sectors.

JEL-codes: D73 K42 O12 P20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://ideas.repec.org/jmp/2013/pce148.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmp:jm2013:pce148

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2013 Papers from Job Market Papers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Team ().

 
Page updated 2023-10-29
Handle: RePEc:jmp:jm2013:pce148