Assortative matching through signals

Friedrich Poeschel

2013 Papers from Job Market Papers

Abstract: When agents do not know where to find a match, they search. However, agents could direct their search to agents who strategically choose a certain signal. Introducing cheap talk to a model of sequential search with bargaining, we find that signals will be truthful if there are mild complementarities in match production: supermodularity of the match production function is a necessary and sufficient condition. It simultaneously ensures perfect positive assortative matching, so that single-crossing property and sorting condition coincide. As the information from signals allows agents to avoid all unnecessary search, this search model exhibits nearly unconstrained efficiency.

JEL-codes: C78 D83 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dge, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ideas.repec.org/jmp/2013/ppo178.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Assortative matching through signals (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmp:jm2013:ppo178

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2013 Papers from Job Market Papers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Team ().