Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: a real options approach
Dimitrios Zormpas ()
2018 Papers from Job Market Papers
We examine the case of a firm holding the option to make an uncertain and irreversible investment. The firm is decentralized and there is information asymmetry between the owner and the investment manager regarding the price of an input (e.g. a key equipment) that needs to be purchased by an outside supplier with market power. We show that the total loss attributed to the information asymmetry has two components: i) the loss in the decentralized firm itself and ii) a negative externality that the outside input supplier endures. We show that the latter is likely not just a part, but rather the main component of the total loss. Last, we prove that the negative externality is reduced when the principal uses an audit technology in parallel with the bonus-incentive mechanism.
JEL-codes: D82 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmp:jm2018:pzo81
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in 2018 Papers from Job Market Papers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().