Dynamic Many-to-One Matching

Ahmet Altinok

2019 Papers from Job Market Papers

Abstract: We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the followingfeatures: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, eachagent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behaviorin such markets emerges: The side with many slots can manipulate the subsequent matchingmarket in their favor via earlier matchings. In such a setting, a natural question arises: Canwe analyze a dynamic many-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-oneor a dynamic one-to-one market? First, we provide sufficient conditions under which theanswer is yes. Second, we show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchingsare âinferiorâ to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, we extend the model to allow agents onone side to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, we provide arationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the US medical residency matchingmarket compared to the US college-admissions system.

JEL-codes: C71 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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