Superstars in two-sided markets: exclusives or not?
Leonardo Madio (),
Elias Carroni () and
2019 Papers from Job Market Papers
This article studies incentives for a premium provider (Superstar) to offer exclusive contracts to competing platforms mediating the interactions between consumers and firms. When platform competition is intense, more consumers affiliate with the platform favored by Superstar exclusivity. This mechanism is self-reinforcing as firms follow consumer decisions and some join the favored platform only. Exclusivity always benefits firms and might eventually benefit consumers. A vertical merger (platform-Superstar) makes non-exclusivity more likely than if the Superstar was independent. The analysis provides novel insights for managers and policymakers and it is robust to several variations and extensions.
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L22 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-pay
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Working Paper: Superstars in two-sided markets: exclusives or not? (2020)
Working Paper: Superstars in two-sided markets: exclusives or not? (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmp:jm2019:pma2756
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