Generalized Contest Success Functions
Birendra Rai () and
Rajiv Sarin
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Rajiv Sarin: Texas A+M University
No 2007-082, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Abstract:
The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by applied researchers.
Keywords: Contest; Rent Seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-082
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