The Resolution Game - A Multiple Selves Perspective
Dimitri Migrow and
Matthias Uhl ()
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Matthias Uhl: Max Planck Institute of Economics, International Max Planck Research School on Adapting Behavior in a Fundamentally Uncertain World, Jena
No 2009-060, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
The notion of choice inconsistency is widely spread in the literature on behavioral economics. Several approaches were used to account for the observation that people reverse their choices over time. This paper aims to explain the formation of resolutions regarded as internal self-binding devices. It moves away from anthropocentric neoclassicism and embraces a more atomistic notion of a player by defining intrapersonal agents as strategic actors. The magnitude of state-dependency is seen as a key driver of intrapersonal conflict modelled by the incongruity of the preferences of two opposing agents. The sequential conceptualisation basically allows for experimental testing.
Keywords: Multiple Selves; Agency; Intrapersonal Conflict; Resolutions; Self-Binding; Self-Control; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Working Paper: THE RESOLUTION GAME A Multiple Selves Perspective (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-060
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