How norms can generate conflict

Fabian Winter, Heiko Rauhut and Dirk Helbing
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Heiko Rauhut: ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Dirk Helbing: ETH Zurich, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology

No 2009-087, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Norms play an important role in establishing social order. The current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to coordination and cooperation. However, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general theory of "normative conflict" by differentiating between two different kinds of conflict. The first results from distinct expectations of which means should be chosen to fulfil the norm, the second from distinct expectations of how strong the norm should restrain the self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative conflict in an experiment that applies the "strategy method" to the ultimatum game. Our data reveal normative conflict among different types of actors, in particular among egoistic, equity, equality and "cherry picker" types.

Keywords: Social norms; normative conflict; cooperation; ultimatum game; strategy method; equity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D30 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-087

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