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Whose impartiality? An experimental study of veiled stakeholders, impartial spectators and ideal observers

Fernando Aguiar (), Alice Becker and Luis Miller
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Fernando Aguiar: Spanish Council for Scientific Research (IESA-CSIC)

No 2010-040, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: This article defines in a precise manner three different mechanisms to achieve impartiality in distributive justice and studies them experimentally. We consider a first-person procedure, the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and two third-party procedures, the impartial spectator and the ideal observer. As a result, we find striking differences in the chosen outcome distributions by the three methods. Ideal observers that do not have a stake in the allocation problem nor information about their position in society propose significantly more egalitarian distributions than veiled stakeholders or impartial spectators. Risk preferences seem to explain why participants that have a stake in the final allocation propose less egalitarian distributions. Impartial spectators that are informed about their position in society tend to favor stakeholders holding the same position.

Keywords: impartiality; veil of ignorance; impartial spectator; distributive justice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-040

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