Doing good with other people's money: A charitable giving experiment with students in environmental sciences and economics

Fredrik Carlsson, Mitesh Kataria (), Elina Lampi and Maria Levati

No 2010-089, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We augment a standard dictator game to investigate how preferences for an environmental project relate to willingness to limit others' choices. We explore this issue by distinguishing three student groups: economists, environmental economists, and environmental social scientists. We find that people are generally disposed to grant freedom of choice, but only within certain limits. In addition, our results are in line with the widely held belief that economists are more selfish than other people. Yet, against the notion of consumer sovereignty, economists are not less likely to restrict others' choices and impose restrictions closer to their own preferences than the other student groups.

Keywords: dictator game; charitable giving; social preferences; paternalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-ltv and nep-soc
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Working Paper: Doing good with other people’s money: A charitable giving experiment with students in environmental sciences and economics (2011)
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