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Paternalism With Hindsight Do protégés react consequentialistically to paternalism?

Mitesh Kataria (), Maria Levati and Matthias Uhl
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Matthias Uhl: Technical University of Munich

No 2012-050, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We investigate experimentally whether the protégés' reaction to paternalism depends on the consequences of the paternalistic action to their well-being. We find that protégé punish a paternalist restricting their freedom of choice. Yet, this negative reaction is not based on principled grounds because, with hindsight, protégés punish the paternalist only if the restriction makes them worse off. Conversely, if the restriction makes them better off, the protégé on average do not punish and, sometimes, they even reward the paternalist. This suggests that protégés take a consequentialist stand on paternalism. Controlling for intentions ascribed to the patron does not alter our finding.

Keywords: Paternalism; Consequentialism; Value of freedom; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D6 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Journal Article: Paternalism with hindsight: do protégés react consequentialistically to paternalism? (2014) Downloads
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