On the Malleability of Fairness Ideals: Order Effects in Partial and Impartial Allocation Tasks
Natalia Montinari (),
Matteo Ploner and
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Kathrin Dengler-Roscher: Institute of Economics, Ulm University, Germany
Benedikt Werner: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn and Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany
No 2015-006, Jena Economic Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
How malleable are people's fairness ideals? Although fairness is an oft-invoked concept in allocation situations, it is still unclear whether and to what extent people's allocations reflect their fairness ideals. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether people's fairness ideals vary with respect to changes in the order in which they undertake two allocation tasks. Participants first generate resources in a real- effort task and then distribute them. In the partial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for himself and another participant. In the impartial allocation task, the participant determines the earnings for two other participants. We also manipulate the participants' experience, i.e, whether they took part in similar allocation experiments before. We find that participants are more likely to allocate more resources to themselves than what they earned in the real-effort task when they decide partially. Exclusively for inexperienced participants, deciding impartially first dampens selfish behavior when they decide partially.
Keywords: fairness; proportionality principle; dictator; partial stakeholders; impartial spectators; fairness bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: On the Malleability of Fairness Ideals: Order Effects in Partial and Impartial Allocation Tasks (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2015-006
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