Charitable giving and intermediation

Nadine Chlaß, Lata Gangadharan () and Kristy Jones ()
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Kristy Jones: Department of Economics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia

No 2015-021, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: Charitable donations are often made through intermediaries who can fund themselves from these same donations. Donors who purchase charitable output through an intermediary incur a principal-agent problem with unobservable prices. We compare charitable giving in an experiment with and without intermediation. Different donor types emerge: 41 per-cent of all donors reduce their donation in response to intermediation, 59 per-cent of all donors give as much or more with than without intermediation. The price of charitable output does not explain these types and appears to only matter after taking characteristics of donors' moral judgement into account.

Keywords: charitable giving; altruism; intermediation; charitable institutions; price elasticity; moral judgement reasoning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hme
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Charitable Giving and Intermediation (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2015-021

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