Institution Transfers, The Marshall Plan, Europe, and Ukraine: An Analytical Narrative

Atin Basuchoudhary (), Andreas Freytag () and Troy Siemers ()
Additional contact information
Atin Basuchoudhary: Virginia Military Institute
Troy Siemers: Virginia Military Institute

No 2023-017, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: This paper offers an analytical narrative based on an assurance game with two separate populations in an evolutionary setting. In our model, Donors and Recipients are two populations; let us call them Europe and Ukraine. The donor population has two types. A proportion of this population wants to promote a Marshall Plan-type model for the recipient state, and another prefers isolationism. A proportion of the population of the recipient state also intends to coordinate a Marshall Plan-type economic integration. In contrast, others prefer foreign aid but view further integration as a violation of sovereignty (or, with Ukraine, may be afraid of further Russian attacks from this integration). Marshall plan type coordination provides the highest payoffs through, e.g., the peace dividend, better institutions in Ukraine, widened European integration trade links, or global financial integration. Coordination is costly because it requires substantial institutional change on both sides. We use simulations to track outcomes given that European support for Ukraine and Ukrainian desire for aid may be endogenous. Further, we show how these endogenous outcomes respond to political shocks in Europe that affect European support for Ukraine and implicitly the lack of support for Ukraine.

Keywords: Institutional Transfer; Institutional Coordination; Evolutionary Game Theory; Ukraine War; Foreign Aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 P41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-gth, nep-ifn and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2023/wp_2023_017.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2023-017

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Markus Pasche ().