A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity
Biung-Ghi Ju ()
No 200509, WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS from University of Kansas, Department of Economics
A society needs to decide which issues (laws, public projects, public facilities, etc.) in an agenda to accept. The decision can be any subset of the agenda but must reflect the preferences of its members, which are assumed to be ¡°separable weak orderings¡±. We characterize a family of ¡°plurality-like¡± rules based on strategy-proofness, restricted efficiency, anonymity, and two weak axioms pertaining to the variable agenda feature of our model, called dummy independence and division indifference. We also characterize a wide spectrum of rules dropping anonymity or restricted efficiency.
Keywords: Plurality; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Restricted efficiency; Anonymity; Division indifference; Separable preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
Date: 2005-03, Revised 2005-03
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Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory
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Journal Article: A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity (2005)
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