A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements: Note
Eric Hoffmann and
Tarun Sabarwal ()
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Eric Hoffmann: Department of Economics, The University of Kansas
No 201409, WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS from University of Kansas, Department of Economics
In a 2007 paper, “A global game with strategic substitutes and complements”, by Karp, L., I.H. Lee, and R. Mason, Games and Economic Behavior, 60(1), 155-175, an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrim in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement and presents an alternative proof for a finite player version of their model.
Keywords: Global games; strategic complements; strategic substitutes; monotone games; equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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