Mixed Oligopoly, Foreign Firms, and Location Choice

Noriaki Matsushima and Toshihiro Matsumura

No 2005-21, Discussion Papers from Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration

Abstract: We investigate a mixed market in which a state-owned, welfare-maximizing public firm competes against profit-maximizing n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms. A circular city model with quantity-setting competition is employed. We find that the equilibrium location pattern depends on m. All private firms agglomerate in the unique equilibrium if m is zero or one. Two foreign firms induce differentiation between domestic and foreign private firms. More than two foreign firms yield differentiation among foreign firms. Regardless of n and m, the agglomeration of all domestic private firms appears in equilibrium. We provide several conditions in which eliminating the public firm from the market enhances social welfare.

Keywords: spatial agglomeration; shipping model; foreign firms; herd behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 L13 R32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2005-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.b.kobe-u.ac.jp/papers_files/2005_21.pdf First version, 2005 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Mixed oligopoly, foreign firms, and location choice (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kbb:dpaper:2005-21

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Yasuyuki Miyahara ().