Access Charge, Vertical Separation, and Lobbying

Toshihiro Matsumura and Noriaki Matsushima

No 2009-11, Discussion Papers from Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration

Abstract: We investigate the manner in which vertical separation affects lobbying activities as well as the access charges for essential facilities. We find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and new entrants.

Keywords: network industry; access charge; manipulation of accounting; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2009-03
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https://www.b.kobe-u.ac.jp/papers_files/2009_11.pdf First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Access charges, vertical separation, and lobbying (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kbb:dpaper:2009-11

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