Evaluating the potential of marketable permits in a framed field experiment: Forest conservation in Nepal
Raja Timilsina () and
Koji Kotani ()
No SDES-2015-22, Working Papers from Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management
A marketable permits system (MPS) has been deemed effective in laboratory experiments, however, little is known about how the MPS works in the field. We evaluate the MPS efficiency for forest conservation by framed field experiments in Nepal. Forestland demands are elicited from farmers, with which the experiments are carried out. The novelty lies in instituting a uniform price auction (UPA) under trader settings and in identifying the efficiency in the field of developing nations. The results suggest that farmers with limited education understand UPA rules, reveal their forestland valuations and that the MPS is effective with 80% of efficiency.
Keywords: uniform price auction; marketable permits system; framed field experiment; forest management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2015-09, Revised 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env and nep-exp
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Published in SDE Series, September 2015, pages 1-47
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http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2015-22.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Evaluating the potential of marketable permits in a framed field experiment: Forest conservation in Nepal (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2015-22
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